Re: <nettime> social media critique: next steps?

[carlo von lynX <lynX@time.to.get.psyced.org>]

On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 11:55:47AM +0100, Andre Rebentisch wrote:
> and the conservative technologist (=us) then says: Who needs X, there is Y.

I guess I don't qualify. Slack, Mattermost and Matrix bring a lot
to the table that IRC doesn't provide.

> The real issue of the last decade is that customers always trade less
> invasive modes of communication for new modes that include behavioral
> tracking as a business and revenue model.

By "Tell them they can have their cake and eat it" I mean not
that they can be pacified with XMPP when they actually want
Whatsapp. I mean that the surveillance revenue model becomes
illegal and therefore Whatsapp, Slack or Facebook becomes an
app that you can *buy* for a moderate amount of money and then
runs off of your device using a distributed network instead of
a cloud and is technically *impeded* from exfiltrating user
information to the company that wrote the software.

So they can have most of the things they have grown accostumed
to, only that the underlying protocol stack and surveillance
economy have been replaced.

> With (default) encryption of email you solve the classic privacy
> shortcoming of email. Now, users weight the costs of that, and
> ironically they do often opt for more privacy invading solutions. At
> times, the privacy invading mechanisms may even be more protective
> depending on your threat model. As an example, during the Syrian
> uprising using GMAIL webmail might have protected the communication of a
> dissident better that having sophisticated encrypted mail installed on
> your local devices (that gets you killed when found).

I don't consider the shortcoming of SMTP solvable as long as
metadata collection challenges our collective ability to exercise
democracy. Our threat model is different: at some point in time
we chose to have a democratic constitution (or equivalent) and
should the majority of politicians still value such constitution
(they better should, because if mass manipulation goes on they
will all lose their jobs and be replaced by less friendly folks)
then it is high time for them to enact measures to protect
democracy from technology. These measures might lead to suitable
new protocol standards which by mistake might make also the Syrian
Internet harder to monitor, but that is not the primary goal.

> When we open our mind to the idea of competing media platforms it
> becomes clear what will "end Facebook": Other platforms that serve
> similar purposes, are more convenient, better integrated and so forth.

And also pose a serious threat to democracy, because platforms that
don't do so cannot economically compete with those that do. The
market can't fix this problem. Only regulation can.

> Morlock Elloi wrote: "1. The current (and foreseeable) political climate
> will not have any monopoly-breaking anti-trust mechanisms applied,
> period. This is the 20th century thinking, a non-starter. The opposite
> actually happens."

I see a general intellectual awakening to the fact that the Clinton
generation made a mistake in dropping FDR anti-trust policies, and
all the left-wing governments of Europe following suit. Let's see
if that awakening comes in time to have political repercussions.
EC is already trying out all tricks to deal with the Silicon Valley
monopolists, but it isn't daring to impede abuse on a technological
level directly.

> I would argue that a "data cartel" law is feasible, both technically
> (=proper legal instruments) and practically (enforcing it), as well as
> politically (majority consent). Right now no one is asking for that.

I think that we won't achieve our societal goals if we only "forbid",
not impede technology from breaking democracy. I wonder if we will 
still have enough democracy by the time EC learns that forbidding
didn't work out (who cares if data crime produces no evidence? the
strategic gains outplay the risks of getting caught big time), or if
all of today's staff will be decomissioned (SCNR) and replaced by
figures that follow other people's interests.

> That also means, to not only rely on data protection laws as a panacea
> but add a layer of data use and anti-eavesdropping protective measures
> enshrined in law, as well as - your agenda - demands for technical
> minimum standards in communications.

Not sure if the word "agenda" is suitable if the person promoting it
has little personal gain in it, but yes, that's what I've been talking
about ever since the dreadful summer of 2013.

> "It is as possible to fix Facebook as it was possible to fix slavery. "

I find this phrase quite fitting, actually. By fixing slavery, a
minimum of civil rights was introduced into the labor market.
By fixing Facebook the way I suggest, we reinvent social networking
as a civil fundamental thing and enable a market of fair trade,
free of middle men. I know this has been promised gazillion times
before, but as long as distributed networking software to actually
achieve this hasn't reached the necessary maturity, it's not there.

Just because neither federation nor blockchain can provide this,
it doesn't mean it can't be done. From my perspective on technology
I say it can only happen if regulation produces the incentive for
industry to solve this challenge - by making anything that doesn't
deliver an end to digital slavory illegal by the year 2023 or so.

This would guarantee a stress-free transition for the general
population from data slavory to a constitutional Internet.

> Our governments are still in the position to "bribe slave owners". We
> would probably want to start on the node level, with the basic platform
> technology, OS, web browsers and so forth first, fixing the pre-2000s
> issues. The best indication of the power of our governments is the
> amount of lobbying we see in Brussels, how serious the technology
> companies take the regulatory process.
> 
> I would argue what is missing are just sponsors of the reform lobbying.

Yup.

And people on the streets demanding the end of digital slavory.


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