human being on Sun, 18 Aug 2002 01:43:57 +0200 (CEST)

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<nettime> developing international insecurity

  // submitting to nettime for group analysis for corollaries that
  // subscribers may or may not find in relation to today's develop-
  // ments in both .US and international securitization programs.
  // what is striking about the following, in one possible reading,
  // is that it mirrors the now developing 'citizencorps' program,
  // as part of the Homeland Defense Inc. initiative. that is, the
  // use of community leaders, etc, phrased as being in 'foreign'
  // countries, use of military-political influence, to deal with
  // subversions and insurgency, at times said as 'communist' and
  // at others as a broad generalization, as with the word: LOCAL. has a link to some documents from the .US national
  security from the Johnson Administration, one of which caught my
  eye in the index (as 'energy' and 'infrastructure' were not found).
  it was on 'internal defense' and i thought, hmmm, wonder if it is
  in any way an early corollary to today's security developments. and
  'development' is a keyword in the documents, along with other things
  that are oddly prescient to the idea of Homeland Security, including
  what seems like a 1:1 ratio with 'citizencorps' programs (TIPs, mtgs
  with businesses/leaders/police/institutions/officials in communities
  which is as disturbing as TIPs but worse, as it is institutionalized
  and politicizing an internal politics/ideology via authority/power).
  especially the notion of an information agency which if not already
  part of the bureaucracy may be recently proposed as Public-Relations
  for the US image abroad (and at home). if one substitutes anything
  for [communist] or leaves that blank, and accepts that as written,
  it includes the possibility of 'homeland defense' as internal defense,
  it seems very similar to what is going on today, in the United States.
  some thoughts. nothing definitive, not from my brain at least. bc

  [note: 'development' processes for actions both at home and abroad.]


Foreign Relations of the United States:
1964-1968, Volume X, National Security Policy
Released by the Office of the Historian
[Document 19]

19. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Counselor and Chairman of 
the Policy Planning Council (Rostow)/1/

Washington, March 12, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/PC 
Files: Lot 70 D 199, Internal Security. Secret. Cleared by Eric E. 
Oulashin (AF), Ellwood M. Rabenold (ARA), Richard E. Usher (FE), and 
Donald W. Bunte (NEA).

BNSP Planning Task II (E)--"U.S. Government Organization for Internal Defense"

Attached is the paper "U.S. Government Organization for Internal 
Defense" developed in response to the BNSP Planning Task II (E) and 
in collaboration with other bureaus within the Department of State as 
well as other agencies with responsibilities in the field of overseas 
internal defense.

While this document was prepared in consultation with other 
interested agencies and in it we have payed attention to those 
internal defense organizational changes that have come about since 
the early days of the Kennedy Administration, it has not been 
subjected to formal interdepartmental clearance. I assume that, if 
formal interdepartmental clearance is desired, you will initiate 
this. Within the Department, however, the paper has been formally 
cleared with the appropriate bureaus and consequently officially 
represents the Department's organization for internal defense policy 
and related activities.

Unless notified to the contrary, I will assume that G/PM has now 
satisfied the requirements of BNSP Planning Task II (E).





A. Introductory

The purpose of this paper is to outline the organization of the U.S. 
Government for the task of detecting and either preventing or 
defeating subversive insurgency in friendly foreign countries. Its 
scope embraces both Washington and the field.

B. Background

The document entitled "United States Overseas Internal Defense 
Policy" (USOIDP) September 1962/2/ sets forth the pattern, factors, 
and lessons of communist insurgency, and describes the scope and 
application of U.S. strategy to counter it. This document, 
promulgated as national policy by NSAM 182 on August 24, 1962/3/ and 
distributed to all departments, agencies, and field posts in 
September, 1962, is currently under review by an interdepartmental 
panel under the chairmanship of the Department of State.

/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 106.

/3/See ibid., Document 105.

The thesis of the USOIDP document is that subversive insurgency 
represents primarily a Communist attempt to retard, exploit and/or 
gain control of the development process in underdeveloped countries, 
and that this threat requires an effective response by the threatened 
government covering a wide spectrum of political, economic, military, 
psychological, and other measures. The U.S. role in countering this 
subversive threat is regarded as ancillary to the local government's. 
The way in which the U.S. Government organizes itself to assist in 
this task in any given situation will normally be a reflection of the 
degree of U.S. influence and freedom of action the U.S. may enjoy in 
the country threatened by subversive insurgency.

C. U.S. Internal Defense Role

The U.S. purpose in the field of internal defense is to encourage and 
assist vulnerable nations to develop balanced capabilities for the 
internal defense of their societies. The U.S. role is normally 
supplementary to the local effort and therefore designed:

1. To assist in the immunization of vulnerable societies not yet 
seriously threatened by Communist subversion or insurgency.

2. To assist countries where subversive insurgency is latent or 
incipient by removing the causes before the stage of insurgency is 

3. To assist in the establishment or strengthening of intelligence 
and internal security organizations.

4. To defeat subversive insurgency in countries actively threatened 
by assisting the government under attack with military and 
non-military means.

5. To build confidence in and loyalty to the host government.

6. To minimize the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement in 
internal war by maximizing indigenous capabilities for identifying, 
preventing, and if necessary, defeating subversive insurgency, and by 
drawing on, as appropriate, the assistance of third countries and 
international organizations.

To play its role effectively, the United States must be in a position 
to mobilize, coordinate, and apply its own and other free world 
resources to strengthen the local internal defense capability in the 
following critical areas: (a) military, (b) police, (c) economic 
development, (d) youth, (e) labor, (f) education, (g) leader groups, 
(h) political institutions, (i) informational and psychological.

As a corollary, the U.S. Government must strengthen organization, and 
procedures to enable it to apply these resources in a unified, 
coordinated, and effective manner.

D. Current Washington Organization

1. Special Group (CI)

In recognition of the growing problem of subversion and insurgency, 
the Special Group (CI) was established in January 1962 by 
Presidential directive (NSAM 124)/4/ to provide unity of effort and 
use of all available resources to identify, prevent, or defeat 
subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in 
friendly countries.

/4/See ibid., Document 68.

The functions of the Special Group (CI) are to insure: proper 
recognition of the subversive insurgency threat; reflection of such 
recognition in training, equipment, and doctrine; marshaling of 
resources to deal with the threat, and development of programs aimed 
at defeating it. In addition, its purpose is to insure the 
development of adequate programs aimed at identifying, preventing, or 
defeating subversive insurgency and indirect aggression in countries 
and regions specifically assigned to it by the President, and to 
resolve any interdepartmental problems which might impede their 

In performing the above functions, the members of the Special Group 
(CI) act on behalf of their respective departments and agencies, and 
depend for staff support upon their own staffs, and upon such 
country, regional, or functional interdepartmental committees 
(normally chaired by a State Department Assistant Secretary) as may 
be established. Consequently, the Special Group (CI) itself has no 
permanent organizational structure except for its Subcommittee on 
Training. This has the responsibility for keeping under review 
internal defense training conducted by all departments and agencies. 
Agency training requirements have been established by National 
Security Action Memorandum 131./5/

/5/See ibid., Document 128, footnote 3.

2. Departmental Organization

It will be noted that the charter of the Special Group (CI) 
specifically provides that program implementation is the 
responsibility of the departments and agencies represented on the 
Group. Each department and agency represented on the Special Group 
(CI) has organized itself differently for its internal defense 
mission. By and large, they have relied on their various "roles and 
missions" as set forth in "United States Overseas Internal Defense 
Policy". Each department and agency (State, DOD, AID, USIA, and CIA) 
has therefore designated an element within its organization that is 
charged with the functional task of giving continued attention to 
overseas internal defense activities. The elements so designated are:

Department of State: Office of Politico-Military Affairs

Department of Defense: International Security Affairs: Special 
Assistant (to Assistant Secretary) for Special Operations; Joint 
Chiefs of Staff: Special Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, for 
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA)

AID: AID/PC--Special Assistant for Internal Defense

CIA: Deputy Director for Plans, Special Group Office

USIA: Office of Policy (IOP)

Program and policy responsibility for particular geographic areas 
rests in the regional organizations of the above departments and 
agencies. Thus, the day-to-day coordination of the many programs and 
policy decisions involved in the U.S. internal defense effort is 
normally effected by the regional officers of the several departments 
and agencies making contact with each other and meeting as the 
occasion requires in coordination with the designated elements 
identified above. In addition, ad hoc groups under the chairmanship 
of State meet as required to develop and monitor country programs and 
to review country internal defense plans and progress reports prior 
to submission to interdepartmental regional policy committees and as 
required to the Special Group (CI).

a. Department of State

The Department of State, in accordance with its primary 
responsibility in the field of foreign affairs, provides policy 
guidance and coordination of overseas internal defense policy. Such 
guidance and coordination is normally effected through the Chiefs of 
Mission and principal officers overseas and the Department of State 
in Washington.

Within State, the focal point for the functional coordination of 
internal defense policy and activity is the responsibility of the 
Office of Politico-Military Affairs (G/PM--Internal Defense). 
Responsibility for internal security assessments, policy, and program 
implementation coordination for particular countries and areas rests 
in the regional bureaus in coordination with the appropriate regional 
politico-military affairs advisors and G/PM--Internal Defense.

b. Department of Defense

Within the Department of Defense, responsibility for the functional 
coordination of internal defense activities is divided between the 
civilian staff element (ISA) and military staff element (JCS).

International Security Affairs (ISA)

The civilian element responsible for direction, coordination and 
guidance for internal defense policy within the Department of Defense 
is the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA. To support the Assistant 
Secretary in this function, a Special Assistant for Special 
Operations has been designated whose responsibilities include 
providing policy guidance to the military assistance program--a vital 
and major element of US overseas internal defense programs.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Special Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, for 
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) is charged with 
assisting the Director, Joint Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
all matters pertaining to insurgency and counterinsurgency. 
Accordingly, SACSA serves as the focal point for such matters for the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. His duties include planning, programming, 
resource development and allocation, and doctrinal guidance. 
Additionally, he is responsible for discharging Department of Defense 
staff responsibilities pertaining to the planning and direction of 
those special cold war operations and special activities, not 
principally intelligence in character, in which the Department of 
Defense participates.

c. Agency for International Development

The Administrator of AID has appointed a Special Assistant for 
Internal Defense to coordinate the formulation of internal defense 
programming and programming guidance. The Special Assistant for 
Internal Defense serves as a focal point within AID on internal 
defense matters and establishes and maintains those interagency 
relationships necessary to ensure that AID activities are in 
consonance with U.S. overseas internal defense policy and integrated 
with the programs of the other U.S. agencies. It is his further 
responsibility to provide general direction to program planning and 
development in this field. Programming responsibility for internal 
defense activities, as in the case of all AID programs, rests with 
each regional assistant administrator and, for police assistance 
programs, with the Director of the Office of Public Safety.

d. United States Information Agency

Coordination and general direction of internal defense policy and 
activities in USIA is the responsibility of the Office of Policy 
(IOP). The several geographic area offices are responsible for 
participation in internal security assessments and Agency program 
implementation in particular countries.

e. Central Intelligence Agency

Responsibility for the staff coordination of overseas internal 
defense and counterinsurgency matters rests with the Special Group 
Officer of CIA's Deputy Director for Plans. He is assisted in this 
responsibility by a very small staff known as the Counterinsurgency 
Group. Intelligence support to the Special Group (CI) and its member 
agencies, both in Washington and to the Country Team abroad, is 
provided by the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Operational support 
to U.S. overseas internal defense programs in both the clandestine 
intelligence and covert action fields is exercised through the office 
of the Deputy Director for Plans and CIA's Chiefs of Station abroad.

E. Internal Defense Plan Program

Pursuant to the directive of the Special Group (CI), country internal 
defense plans (IDP) have been required for a wide range of 
underdeveloped countries, including, but not limited to, those 
countries under the immediate cognizance of the Group. Such plans are 
normally developed after detailed internal security assessments are 
made either on the initiative of the Chief of Mission or Washington. 
Each IDP is given a comprehensive screening and review by an 
interdepartmental working group assembled under the chairmanship of 
the State regional bureau. The results of this critique are 
incorporated in an explanatory memorandum from the regional Assistant 
Secretaries of State to the Special Group (CI) recommending approval 
or modification as required. After approval by the Group the IDP 
becomes the basis for a program of specific actions.

In general, the IDP is designed to serve the following purposes:

(1) To assure continuing attention by the Country Team to details of 
the local situation.

(2) To sharpen the Country Team's ability to forecast dangerous 
trends and suggest remedies.

(3) To provide a framework within which to assess programs suggested 
by the local government.

(4) To persuade the local government to adopt the most promising 
course of action.

(5) To facilitate planning and program coordination in Washington.

(6) To provide clearly defined U.S. courses of action and establish 
resource requirements (including funding) covering a one-year 
projection which, if approved by the Special Group (CI), is binding 
on all participating agencies.

F. Conclusions

Except for the creation of the Special Group (CI), the U.S. 
organization for the internal defense effort has been mounted and 
executed by and large within the framework of existing governmental 
organization. It is believed that by adhering to the traditional 
lines of organization and by its determination not to recreate an 
OCB-type structure, President Kennedy gave the Foreign Affairs 
agencies an opportunity to develop a more vigorous response to the 
problem of Communist subversion and insurgency. To insure this, the 
Administration created the Special Group (CI) and confined its role 
primarily to finding the weak spots in our internal defense effort 
and to spurring governmental action where necessary. On reflection, 
it appears from this vantage point in time, that the determination of 
the White House not to recreate an OCB and to thrust the primary 
responsibility for internal defense policy and programs on the 
appropriate departments and agencies has proven to be sound.

Accordingly, it is concluded that the official Washington community 
has effectively responded to the organizational requirements set 
forth under the basic National Security Policy Planning Tasks II (E). 
The present organization for internal defense provides the U.S. 
Government a far better ability to cope with the growing problem of 
subversive insurgency today as compared to the general situation 
prevailing in Washington in early 1961. Although the success or 
failure of a particular course of action can not be a valid test of 
whether the organization supporting it is adequate, the ability to 
develop, plan and initiate programs responding to newly developing 
problem situations is testimony to effective organization.


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